Defense
wins championships. It’s an adage almost as old as the game of football itself,
and one most reasonable fans have long since grown sick of. The basic idea is
that while offense produces all the stats and all the stars, ultimately the
defensive side of the ball is just as, if not more, important to actually
winning football games.
This
belief has become even harder to back up as league rules and schemes have
shifted more heavily in favor of the offense over the past twenty years. But it
saw a resurgence last year, as scoring fell across the league and the final
four was represented by teams quarterbacked by Case Keenum, Nick Foles, and
Blake Bortles, with Foles’s Eagles ultimately winning the Super Bowl.
Less
than a year later, it is becoming increasingly clear how much of an outlier the
2017 season was. Scoring has leapt again across the league to the highest level
in history, and the teams at the top of the league are the teams that can score
a lot of points. The three highest scoring teams in the league are the Rams,
Chiefs, and Saints, who also happen to be the teams with the three best records
in the league.
More
glaring is what happened to the teams that were in the championship round a
year ago. The Vikings, Eagles, and Jaguars were a sign of the resurgence of
defense, and a year later they are three of the most disappointing teams in the
league. Minnesota is clinging desperately to a playoff spot, while both
Philadelphia and Jacksonville are on the outside looking in. All three teams
returned essentially the same core on the defensive side of the ball, and two of the three are still playing defense at a high level, with Minnesota and
Jacksonville still in the top 10 of defensive DVOA. And yet, they haven’t won
games in the way they did a season ago.
This
inconsistency among defensive teams is hardly a revelation. A couple years ago
I looked at offensive and defensive performance from year to year, and I found
that offensive DVOA was more than twice as sticky as defensive from one year to the
next. And since then we have only gotten more anecdotal evidence, perhaps as
best explained by the past three years of the New York Giants.
During
the 2016 offseason the Giants went all out in free agency on the defensive side
of the ball, signing Janoris Jenkins, Damon Harrison, and Olivier Vernon to
massive long term deals. And in the immediate aftermath, it looked like this
was an absolutely brilliant decision. New York’s defense leapt to the top of
the league in 2016, carrying the team to a playoff berth. Even after a first
round exit, they were feeling pretty good about where their team was at, with
the core of an elite defense locked up for years to come.
Since
then they have won a total of seven games. Not only has their record fallen off
a cliff, their defense has as well. After finishing second in defensive DVOA in
2016, they have been in the bottom ten each of the past two years, and they
have already started carving up the expensive core of their defense to start
over. The one year jump in defensive performance was not sustainable, and their
record has reflected that.
The
Giants were the clearest example of the pitfalls of investing heavily on the
defensive side of the ball, at least until this year. We have a new contender
now in Jacksonville, a team that dedicated incredible resources in both the
draft and free agency towards building their defense. A year ago this allowed
them to cover the blemishes at quarterback, getting out to early leads and
salting the game away with an aggressive ball-hawking defense and a physical
running game. In 2018 however, the turnovers haven’t been quite as present on
defense, they haven’t had the same luck jumping out to early leads, and they
have been forced to rely more on Blake Bortles, with predictably disastrous
results.
It
is still possible to win games through a strong defense and running game. We
saw an example of this early in the year, when the Washington
Redskins jumped to the head of the NFC East on the back of Adrian Peterson and
an emerging defensive line. Before the injury to Alex Smith they were 6-3, and in those nine games they did not experience a single lead
change. When they scored first, they held on to the lead until the end of the
game. When the other team scored first, they were unable to come back.
Playing
this style gives an incredibly small margin of error, which is why it is
unsurprising when situations reverse from one year to the next. It’s typical to
look for regression by teams that outperform in tight contests (such as
Minnesota last year), but for a team like Jacksonville even blowout victories
can easily be swung the other way by a change in circumstances early in the
game. Playing with a lead and playing from behind are very different
situations, even in the first half when there should be plenty of time to
overcome any deficit.
The
volatility of investing in the defensive side of the ball can be both a
positive and a negative thing. For a team looking for a jump like the 2016
Giants or the 2017 Jaguars, it’s easier to turn things around by loading
up on talent defensively. But these jumps are often followed up by equally
drastic falls, and investing in offense provides a much longer competitive
window.
This
is my intuition, and I wanted to find some way to quantify the concept of
investment. There are two major ways that teams invest in players, either
through the draft or with big contracts handed out to veterans. (They also
invest in trades, but these are rarer and more complicated to track and
quantify, so I ignored them).
I
calculated the percentage of investment towards offense and defense for both of
these categories. For the draft I looked at the last four years—the length of
rookie contracts—and I calculated the total draft value given to each side of
the ball using Chase Stuart’s draft value model. For spending I looked at a
team’s entire roster and took the sum of the average annual value for each
player’s contracts (using this rather than cap hit, because contracts are often
structured with weird spikes and drops in cap value).
This
provided the following table of percentage invested on the offensive side of
the ball. A higher number means more investment in offense, while a lower
number shows a team has been defense focused in building their roster.
Draft
|
Money
|
Average
|
|
LAR
|
85%
|
47%
|
66%
|
SEA
|
53%
|
65%
|
59%
|
NYG
|
56%
|
57%
|
57%
|
IND
|
45%
|
68%
|
57%
|
CLE
|
49%
|
63%
|
56%
|
PHI
|
55%
|
56%
|
56%
|
OAK
|
40%
|
70%
|
55%
|
BAL
|
56%
|
52%
|
54%
|
ARI
|
54%
|
53%
|
53%
|
HOU
|
62%
|
44%
|
53%
|
DET
|
55%
|
50%
|
53%
|
TAM
|
53%
|
52%
|
52%
|
CIN
|
55%
|
48%
|
51%
|
TEN
|
60%
|
43%
|
51%
|
LAC
|
46%
|
56%
|
51%
|
CHI
|
56%
|
46%
|
51%
|
CAR
|
50%
|
49%
|
50%
|
NWE
|
46%
|
53%
|
50%
|
WAS
|
45%
|
54%
|
50%
|
ATL
|
30%
|
65%
|
47%
|
MIN
|
47%
|
47%
|
47%
|
DAL
|
37%
|
57%
|
47%
|
PIT
|
36%
|
58%
|
47%
|
DEN
|
54%
|
38%
|
46%
|
NYJ
|
43%
|
49%
|
46%
|
KAN
|
40%
|
51%
|
46%
|
GNB
|
25%
|
66%
|
45%
|
NOR
|
33%
|
57%
|
45%
|
MIA
|
48%
|
41%
|
45%
|
SFO
|
35%
|
52%
|
44%
|
BUF
|
41%
|
44%
|
43%
|
JAX
|
41%
|
41%
|
41%
|
The
names at the very top and very bottom of the list immediately jump out. I’ve
already discussed the Jaguars at length, and it isn’t a surprise to see them
leading the field in defensive investment. Even after handing out big contracts
this offseason to Andrew Norwell, Donte Moncrief, and Bortles, the sheer amount
they’ve given to Malik Jackson, Calais Campbell, and AJ Bouye over the past few
years continues to drag them down.
On
the other side, it is equally unsurprising to see one of the league’s best
offenses sitting at the top. The Rams have been extremely aggressive about
paying talent on the offensive side of the ball, adding veterans Andrew
Whitworth and Brandin Cooks, as well as giving a big extension to Todd Gurley.
If anything this number actually undersells how heavily they have invested on
that side of the ball, as it doesn’t include the first round pick they traded
for Cooks or the premium they paid to move up and select Jared Goff (the same
can also be said about Philadelphia, Kansas City, Houston, the Jets, and to a
lesser extent Chicago).
Look
deeper in the list and some other trends start to emerge. Seattle,
Indianapolis, and Cleveland are all in the top five of offensive investment,
and they have all exceeded expectations and taken major steps forward as the
season has gone along. While at the bottom, teams like Buffalo, San Francisco,
and Miami are fighting just to stay afloat with defense oriented teams. Buffalo
in particular is utterly devoid of talent on the offensive side, and even after
moving up into the top ten to draft Josh Allen they are facing a major uphill
climb just to reach acceptable in that phase of the game.
There
are a couple of notable exceptions that stand out at the bottom of the list.
Both New Orleans and Pittsburgh are among the most defensive oriented spenders
in the league, and both are also among the top teams in their respective
conference. They are very similar stories to each other, teams led by Hall of
Fame quarterbacks who have spent the past five years desperately trying to
scrape together basic competence on the defensive side of the ball, with very
mixed success. But the strength at quarterback has allowed them to elevate
their offenses despite an absence of investment there, giving them a chance to
win even while their roster construction leaves something to be desired.
Of
course, having a Hall of Fame quarterback is easier said than done, and it is
hardly a foolproof strategy. Green Bay is also in the bottom ten of offensive
investment, and it has been glaringly obvious this year as they have been
forced to turn to low drafted rookies just to keep their passing attack afloat.
Where the Steelers and Saints have excelled finding star skill position players
in the later rounds of the draft (JuJu Smith-Schuster, James Conner, Michael
Thomas, and Alvin Kamara are all still on rookie contracts), the Packers have
left their offense completely barren of talent to work with.
One
of the more fascinating teams on this list is Chicago. At first glance you’d
assume they would be in a similar position to Jacksonville last year or the
Giants two seasons ago. They’ve run out to a surprise lead in the NFC North
thanks to the best defense in football, the sort of performance that just
screams regression for next year. They have spent top ten selections on Leonard
Floyd and Roquan Smith in the past three years, and while this analysis doesn’t
capture the massive package of draft picks they sent to the Raiders for Khalil
Mack, it does include the record breaking contract they signed him to prior to
the season.
And
yet, the Bears sit squarely in the middle of the pack in terms of offensive
investment. They have been just as dedicated to building that side of the ball,
and while the results haven’t quite showed up yet, there is still a lot of
potential in Mitchell Trubisky, Allen Robinson, and the other players on this
unit. When things inevitably regress on their defense (notably, when Eddie
Jackson stops scoring touchdowns in every game), there is a chance the offense
can step forward and pick up the slack.
Am
I certain this is going to happen? No, I’m not. Right now Chicago’s offense is
merely average, and it is more difficult to take a jump on that side of the
ball than on defense. There is still a very real chance that this season is a
flash in the pan for them rather than the first sign of sustained success, and
among the young teams at the top of the league I would take the futures of the Rams
or the Chiefs over the Bears in a heartbeat, especially as they are left with
little money and few draft picks to truly try to improve their offense. Only
time will tell whether they can continue to win as a defense first team, or if
they will fall back to Earth like so many others have done before them.
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